cognitive-relativism
The doctrine that knowledge and truth standards are entirely relative to social groups with no inherent validity beyond their acceptance.
2 chapters across 1 book
Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2003)Nicholas Rescher
Chapter 9 critiques cognitive relativism, which holds that all knowledge standards are equally valid based solely on group acceptance, arguing that this position is flawed because it ignores the rational primacy of our own epistemic standards. The chapter contrasts relativism with contextualism, emphasizing that reason and objective standards—though not absolute or godlike—are necessary for meaningful inquiry and that rational acceptance carries a claim to universality. It concludes that relativism fails due to its neglect of functional efficacy in rational inquiry and that reasonable individuals can identify truths through shared rational standards.
This chapter explores the epistemological debate between foundationalism and coherentism, contrasting the hierarchical Euclidean model of knowledge with the network-like cyclic systematization. It further examines the coherentist approach to truth, cognitive relativism and contextualism, and the pragmatic rationale behind cognitive objectivity and rationality. The discussion highlights challenges such as validating objectivity and rationality, and defends the pragmatic necessity of objectivity and rational inquiry despite their inherent complexities.