dialectic-of-recognition
Hegel's idea that self-consciousness emerges through mutual recognition between self and Other, which Sartre critiques as epistemologically optimistic and flawed.
1 chapter across 1 book
Being and Nothingness (1943)Jean-Paul Sartre
This chapter critiques Hegel's conception of self-consciousness, arguing that the relation between reflection and the reflecting consciousness is not one of identity but of a being that negates itself. Sartre emphasizes that consciousness is a concrete, unique being (ipseity) distinct from an abstract ego or self-identity, and that the recognition of self by the Other cannot achieve a universal, reciprocal self-consciousness as Hegel claims. The chapter also explores the fundamental unknowability of the Other's consciousness and the impossibility of fully objectifying oneself through the Other, challenging Hegel's optimistic epistemology and dialectic of recognition.