epistemic-gap
The unavoidable disparity between our objective factual claims and the limited evidence supporting them, highlighting the uncertainty inherent in knowledge.
2 chapters across 1 book
Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2003)Nicholas Rescher
Chapter 2 explores the concept of fallibilism in epistemology, emphasizing the inherent liability of human knowledge to error and the necessity of metaknowledge—knowledge about our knowledge. It discusses the practical acceptance of putative knowledge despite its imperfections, the epistemic challenges such as the Preface Paradox, and the importance of viewing scientific knowledge as best current estimates rather than absolute truths. The chapter also highlights systematic biases in prediction and estimation, advocating for a fallibilist approach that balances costs and benefits in our understanding of truth.
Chapter 4 examines the epistemic justification of objective knowledge claims from a functionalistic and naturalistic perspective, emphasizing the persistent gap between subjective experience and objective fact. It critiques the causal epistemology approach for its reliance on an assumed truth to justify beliefs and proposes a distinction between weak and strong epistemic justification, arguing that experience alone can only provide weak justification for objective claims. The chapter suggests that pragmatic and evolutionary considerations, rather than purely causal ones, are necessary for validating knowledge claims.