fallibilism
The epistemological position that all knowledge claims are subject to error and must be treated as provisional or best estimates rather than absolute truths.
2 chapters across 1 book
Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2003)Nicholas Rescher
Chapter 2 explores the concept of fallibilism in epistemology, emphasizing the inherent liability of human knowledge to error and the necessity of metaknowledge—knowledge about our knowledge. It discusses the practical acceptance of putative knowledge despite its imperfections, the epistemic challenges such as the Preface Paradox, and the importance of viewing scientific knowledge as best current estimates rather than absolute truths. The chapter also highlights systematic biases in prediction and estimation, advocating for a fallibilist approach that balances costs and benefits in our understanding of truth.
This chapter explores the nature and challenges of propositional knowledge, focusing on whether knowledge can be defined as true justified belief. It examines foundational epistemological problems such as fallibilism, skepticism, epistemic justification, and the role of presumption and trust in knowledge acquisition and cooperation. The discussion integrates philosophical analysis with pragmatic and naturalistic perspectives, highlighting the economic and social dimensions of knowledge.