self-presence

This chapter explores the fundamental structures of consciousness, particularly the nature of the for-itself (consciousness) as distinct from the in-itself (being). Sartre critiques previous philosophers like Descartes, Husserl, and Heidegger for their limitations in addressing consciousness and emphasizes the prereflective cogito as the starting point for understanding consciousness's self-presence. He articulates consciousness as inherently non-coincident with itself, characterized by a duality where consciousness is always consciousness of itself, creating a dynamic tension between identity and difference that cannot be reduced to infinite regress or pure unity.

In Chapter 1: The Immediate Structures of the For-Itself, Sartre explores the fundamental nature of consciousness as a for-itself, emphasizing its self-presence and the inherent distance it maintains from itself. The chapter delves into phenomenological methods, the role of negation and lack in consciousness, and the complex interplay between the for-itself and the in-itself, highlighting the contingent and incomplete nature of self-consciousness. Sartre also engages with philosophical predecessors like Heidegger, Hegel, and Spinoza to articulate the dynamic structure of being-for-itself and its existential implications.