tacit-knowledge

Chapter 6 explores the tension between managerial art and management science, emphasizing the limitations of formal analytical tools in capturing the nuanced expertise and intuition of effective managers. It critiques the overreliance on quantitative decision models and highlights the importance of tacit knowledge, human judgment, and democratic values in management decision-making. The chapter also surveys the state of decision analysis, the challenges of automation in managerial contexts, and the sociological implications of expertise and labor.

In this 1969 postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn reflects on critiques and clarifies key concepts, especially the notion of 'paradigm.' He distinguishes between the sociological sense of paradigm as a shared scientific community's beliefs and the philosophical sense as exemplary puzzle-solutions guiding normal science. Kuhn addresses misunderstandings about subjectivity and relativism in science, proposes viewing incommensurable scientific theories as different language communities, and briefly considers the book's applicability beyond science.

This chapter argues that paradigms function as shared exemplars or problem-solving models within scientific communities, which students and scientists learn to recognize and apply through practice rather than solely through theoretical instruction. Kuhn emphasizes that scientific knowledge is embodied in these exemplars, which teach practitioners how to see and interpret nature in a group-licensed way, highlighting the tacit knowledge acquired by doing science. Historical examples illustrate how scientists solve new problems by analogy to prior solutions, underscoring the importance of learning to perceive similarities and apply law-sketches flexibly.

This chapter explores the nature of tacit knowledge and intuition in scientific practice, arguing that such knowledge is not individual or unanalyzable but shared, acquired through exemplars, and embedded in neural processing shaped by education and experience. Kuhn emphasizes that perception and recognition operate differently from rule-based interpretation, and that much scientific knowledge is tacit, transmitted through training and group membership rather than explicit criteria or rules. He also highlights the variability of perception across different groups and the importance of shared exemplars in learning to recognize and categorize phenomena.

This chapter primarily consists of bibliographic references and brief commentary related to the development of scientific paradigms and knowledge acquisition. It highlights the role of tacit knowledge in scientific success, as argued by Michael Polanyi, and touches on Ludwig Wittgenstein's perspective on language and naming in relation to scientific understanding. The chapter situates these ideas within broader historical and philosophical contexts, emphasizing the priority and influence of paradigms in shaping scientific thought.