The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chapter 11: ---

Chapter 11 is where Kuhn does something the rest of the book doesn't quite prepare you for — he stops arguing that paradigms replace rules and starts arguing that rules were never really running the show. Scientists don't work by extracting principles from a paradigm and applying them; they work by recognizing resemblance to past solutions, the way you recognize a face without being able to list its features. The Wittgenstein import here is surgical: "family resemblance" isn't decoration, it's load-bearing structure, because it means a scientific community can share a paradigm while disagreeing about what the paradigm actually *says*. This is the chapter where Kuhn explains why methodological debates erupt during crises — not because scientists suddenly forget the rules, but because the rules were always post-hoc reconstructions of something more tacit. The implications are unsettling: if paradigms are transmitted through exemplars and modeling rather than explicit instruction, then scientific education is closer to apprenticeship in a craft guild than to the transmission of propositional knowledge.