Justification

Rescher argues that the justification of rationality must be reflexive — reason validates itself, and this circularity is not vicious but structural, a feature rather than a bug. Set this beside Ellul's observation that modern political doctrine functions as a "rationalizing mechanism" that justifies state action after the fact, with efficiency as the real criterion and justice as the slogan. The junction is unsettling: Rescher's virtuous circle depends on good faith — you enter the circle because you genuinely want reasons. Ellul shows what happens when the circle is entered instrumentally — when justification becomes a technology for manufacturing consent rather than a method for finding truth. The same self-referential structure that makes rationality autonomous also makes it perfectly mimicable by systems that have no interest in truth at all. Presumptive justification — Rescher's "innocent until proven guilty" for beliefs — turns out to be the exact cognitive seam that political technique exploits: we accept what seems reasonable until something displaces it, and the machinery of justification-after-the-fact is designed to ensure nothing ever does.